Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598).html



Japanese invasions of Korea
The Japanese landing on Busan
Date 1592–1598 Location Korean peninsula Result Korean and China victory; Japanese withdrawal from the peninsula.
Belligerents
Korea under the Joseon Dynasty, China under the Ming Dynasty, Jianzhou Jurchens	Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Commanders
Korea King Seonjo Crown Prince Gwanghae Yi Sun-sin†, Gwon Yul, Yu Seong-ryong, Yi Eok-gi†, Won Gyun†, Kim Myeong-won, Yi Il, Sin Rip†, Gwak Jae-u, Kim Si-min† China Li Rusong† (pr.), Li Rubai, Ma Gui (pr.), Qian Shi-zhen, Ren Ziqiang, Yang Yuan, Zhang Shijue, Chen Lin	Japan Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Katō Kiyomasa, Konishi Yukinaga, Kuroda Nagamasa, Todo Takatora, Katō Yoshiaki, Mōri Terumoto, Ukita Hideie, Kuki Yoshitaka, So Yoshitoshi, Kobayakawa Takakage, Wakizaka Yasuharu, Shimazu Yoshihiro, Kurushima Michifusa†
Strength
Korea 84,500 Korean Army, (at the beginning) at least 22,600 Korean volunteers and insurgents China 1st. (1592–1593) 43,000+1 2nd. (1597–1598) 100,0002	Japan 1st. (1592–1593) About 158,000 2nd. (1597–1598) About 141,000
Casualties and losses
Korea military total 300,0003 China military total 30,00045	Japan military total 130,000citation needed
civilian + military total 1,000,0006

Two Japanese invasions of Korea and subsequent battles on the Korean peninsula took place from 1592 to 1598. Toyotomi Hideyoshi led the newly unified Japan into the first invasion (1592-1593) with the professed goal of conquering Korea, the Jurchens, Ming Dynasty China, and India.⁷ The second invasion (1594-1596) was aimed rather solely as a retaliatory offensive against the Koreans.⁷ The invasions are also known as Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, the Seven Year War (in reference to its span) and the Imjin War (한글/Hangul: 임진왜란 - lit. Wa Invasion of the Imjin Year) (in reference to the "Imjin" year of the sexagenary cycle in Korean).⁸ The Japanese name of the war means, "Joseon Campaign"; and the Chinese, "the Eastern Pacification".⁹

Name

The first invasion (1592–1593) is literally called the "Japanese (= 倭 |wae|) Rebellion (= 亂 |ran|) of Imjin" (1592 being an imjin year in the sexagenary cycle) in Korean. Meanwhile, the war is clalled Bunroku no eki in Japanese (Bunroku referring to the Japanese era under the Emperor Go-Yōzei, spanning the period from 1592 to 1596). The second invasion (1597–1598) is called the "Second War of Jeong-yu" and "Keichō no eki", respectively. In Chinese, the wars are referred to as the "Renchen (the information about the Imjin year also applies here) War to Defend the Nation" or the "Wanli Korean Campaign", after then reigning Chinese emperor.

Overview

Initially, the Japanese forces saw successes on land and consistent failures at sea. The Japanese forces came to suffer heavily as their communication and supply lines were thinned. The Korean navy starved the Japanese forces by successfully intercepting the Japanese supply fleets on the western waters of the peninsula, to which most major rivers of the Korean peninsula flow. Ming China under Emperor Wanli brought about a military and diplomatic intervention to the conflict, which China understood as a challenge to its tributary system.¹⁰ The war stalled for five years during which the three countries tried to negotiate a peaceful compromise; however, Japan invaded Korea a second time in 1597. The war concluded with the naval battle at Noryang. All of the Japanese forces in Korea had retreated by the 12th lunar month of 1598 and returned to Japan after the devastating defeat dealt by the Korean navy.

Effects

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In addition to the human losses, Korea suffered tremendous cultural, economic, and infrastructural damage, including a large reduction in the amount of arable land,⁸ destruction and confiscation of significant artworks, artifacts, and historical documents, and abductions of artisans and technicians. During this, the main palaces Gyeongbokgung, Changdeokgung and Changgyeonggung were burned down so the palace Deoksugung was used as temporary palace.¹¹ The heavy financial burden placed on China by the war adversely affected its military capabilities and contributed to the fall of the Ming Dynasty and the rise of the Qing Dynasty.¹² However, the sinocentric tributary system that Ming had defended was restored by Qing, and the normal trade relations between Korea and Japan later continued.¹³

Background

Main articles: Joseon Dynasty and History of Korea

Main articles: Azuchi-Momoyama period and History of Japan

Main articles: Ming Dynasty and History of China

Korea and China before the war

In 1392, the Korean General Yi Seong-gye led a successful coup to take political power from King U of the Goryeo Dynasty by using military force, then his followers forced Yi to take the crown, thus founded Joseon.¹⁴ In search of a justification for its rule given the lack of a royal bloodline, the new regime received recognition from China and integration into its tributary system within the context of the Mandate of Heaven.¹⁵ Under Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's reign during the late 15th century, Japan, too, gained a seat in the tributary system (lost by 1547, see hai jin).¹⁶¹⁷ Within this tributary system, China assumed the role of a big brother, Korea the middle brother, and Japan the younger brother.¹⁸

Unlike the situation over one thousand years earlier when Chinese dynasties had an antagonistic relationship with the largest of the Korean polities (Goguryeo), Ming China had close trading and diplomatic relations with the Joseon Dynasty, which also enjoyed continuous trade relations with Japan.¹⁹

The two dynasties, Ming and Joseon, shared much in common: both emerged during the fourteenth century at the fall of Mongolian rule, embraced Confucian ideals in society, and faced similar external threats (the Jurchen raiders and the Wokou pirates).²⁰ Internally, both China and Korea were troubled with fights among competing political factions, which would significantly influence decisions made by the Koreans prior to the war, and those made during the war by the Chinese.²¹²² Dependence on each other for trade and also having common enemies resulted in Korea and Ming China having a friendly relationship.

Hideyoshi and his preparations

Group of 4 samurai

By the last decade of the 16th century, Hideyoshi as daimyō had unified all of Japan in a brief period of peace. Since Hideyoshi came to hold power in the presence of a legitimate Japanese imperial line, he sought for military power to legitimize his rule and to decrease his dependence on the imperial authority.²³ It is said that Hideyoshi planned for an invasion of China to fulfill the dreams of his late leader Oda Nobunaga,²⁴ and to mitigate the possible threat of civil disorder or rebellion posed by the excess number of samurai and soldiers.²⁵ But it is quite possible that Hideyoshi might have set a more realistic goal of subjugating the smaller neighbouring states (i.e. Ryukyus, Luzon, Taiwan, and Korea), and treating the larger or more distant countries as trading partners, as ²³ all throughout the invasion of Korea, Hideyoshi sought for legal tally trade with China²³ Hideyoshi's need for military supremacy as a justification for his rule which lacked royal background could, on an international level, translate into a Japanocentric order with Japan's neighbouring countries below Japan.²³ Historian Kenneth M. Swope identifies a rumor circulating at the time that Hideyoshi could have been a Chinese who fled to Japan from the law, and therefore sought revenge against China.²⁶

The defeat of the Odawara-based Hōjō clan in 1590²⁷ finally brought about the second unification of Japan,²⁸ and Hideyoshi began preparing for the next war. Beginning in March 1591, the Kyūshū daimyō and their labor forces constructed a castle at Nagoya (in modern-day Karatsu) as the center for the mobilization of the invasion forces.²⁹

Hideyoshi planned for a possible war with Korea long before completing the unification of Japan, and made preparations on many fronts. As early 1578, Hideyoshi, then battling under Nobunaga against Mōri Terumoto for control of the Chūgoku region of Japan, informed Terumoto of Nobunaga's plan to conquer China.³⁰ In 1592 Hideyoshi sent a letter to the Philippines demanding tribute from the governor general and stating that Japan had already received tribute from Korea (which was a misunderstanding, as explained below) and the Ryukyus.³¹

As for the military preparations, the construction of as many as 2,000 ships may have begun as early as 1586.³² To estimate the strength of the Korean military, Hideyoshi sent an assault force of 26 ships to the southern coast of Korea in 1587, and he concluded that the Koreans were incompetent.³³ On the diplomatic front, Hideyoshi began to establish friendly relations with China long before completing the unification of Japan and helped to police the trade routes against the wakō.³⁴

Diplomatic dealings between Japan and Korea

In 1587, Hideyoshi sent his first envoy Tachibana Yasuhiro,³⁵ to Korea, which was during the rule of King Seonjo³⁶ to re-establish diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (broken since the annoying Japanese pirate raid in 1555)³⁷, which Hideyoshi hoped to use as a foundation to induce the Yi Court to join Japan in a war against China.³⁸ Yasuhiro, with his warrior background and an attitude disdainful of the Korean officials and their customs, which he considered effeminate, failed to receive the promise of future ambassadorial missions from Korea.³⁹ Around May 1589, Hideyoshi's second embassy, consisting of Sō Yoshitoshi (or Yoshitomo),⁴⁰ Gensho and Tsuginobu reached Korea and secured the promise of a Korean embassy to Japan in exchange for the Korean rebels which had taken refuge in Japan.³⁹ In fact, in 1587 Hideyoshi had ordered Sō Yoshinori, the father of Yoshitoshi and the daimyō of Tsushima, to offer Joseon the ultimatum of submitting to Japan and participating in the conquest of China, or war with Japan.However, as Tsushima enjoyed a special trading position as the single checkpoint to Korea for all Japanese ships and had permission from Korea to trade with as many as 50 of its own vessels,⁴¹ the Sō family delayed the talks for nearly two years.⁴⁰ Even when Hideyoshi renewed his order, Sō Yoshitoshi reduced the visit to the Yi Court to a campaign to better relations between the two countries. Near the end of the ambassadorial mission, Yoshitoshi presented King Seonjo a brace of peafowl and matchlock guns - the first advanced fire-arms to come to Korea.⁴² Yu Seong-ryong, a high-ranking scholar official, suggested that the military put the arquebus into production and use, but the Yi Court failed to cooperate.⁴³ This lack of interest and underestimation of the power of the arquebus eventually led to the decimation of the Korean army early in the war.

On April 1590, the Korean ambassadors including Hwang Yun-gil, Kim Saung-il and others⁴⁴ left for Kyoto, where they waited for two months while Hideyoshi was finishing his campaign against the Odawara and the Hōjō clans.⁴⁵ Upon his return, they exchanged ceremonial gifts with and delivered King Seonjo's letter to Hideyoshi.⁴⁵ Hideyoshi assumed that the Koreans had come to pay homage as a tributary to Japan, but the Koreans still considered the Japanese as a little brother just as they have for thousands of years. For this reason the ambassadors were not given the formal treatment that was due in handling diplomatic matters; at last, the Korean ambassadors asked that Hideyoshi write a reply to the Korean king, for which they waited 20 days at the port of Sakai.⁴⁶ The letter, redrafted as requested by the ambassadors on the ground that it was too discourteous, invited Korea to submit to Japan and join the war against China.⁴² Upon the ambassadors' return, the Yi Court held serious discussions concerning Japan's invitation;⁴⁷ while Hwang Yun-gil reported to the Yi Court conflicting estimates of Japanese military strength and intentions and pressed that a war is coming, Kim Saung-il claimed that Hideyoshi's saying was nothing but a bluff. Moreover, most of the estimates considered the Japanese to be incompetent. Some, including King Seonjo, argued that Ming should be informed about the dealings with Japan, as failure to do so could make Ming suspect Korea's allegiance, but the Yi Court finally concluded to wait further until the appropriate course of action became definite.⁴⁸

Hideyoshi initiated his diplomacy with Korea under the impression that Korea was a vassal of Tsushima Island^{citation needed}, which the Koreans considered theirs; the Yi Court approached Japan as a country inferior to Korea accordingly within the Chinese tributary system, and it expected Hideyoshi's invasions to be no better than the common Wako pirate raids.⁴⁹ The Yi Court handed to Gensho and Tairano, Hideyoshi's third embassy, King Seonjo's letter rebuking Hideyoshi for challenging the Chinese tributary system; Hideyoshi replied with a disrespectful letter, but, since it was not presented in person as expected by custom, the Yi Court ignored it.⁵⁰ After the denial of his second request, Hideyoshi launched his armies against Korea in 1592. There were internal oppositions to the invasion within Japan's government; among them, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Konishi Yukinaga and Sō Yoshitoshi who tried to arbitrate between Hideyoshi and the Joseon court.^{citation needed}

Military capabilities

Main articles: Military history of Korea, Military history of Japan, and Military history of China

Hwacha were developed by Koreans and could shoot up to 200 arrows at one time.

Strong mountain fortresses like this one in Namhansanseong made up of many of the castles in Korea. Other stone fortresses, however, were of poor quality and structure.

The two major security threats to Korea and China at the time were the Jurchens, who raided along the northern borders, and the wakō (Japanese pirates), who pillaged the coastal villages and trade ships.⁵¹⁵²
In response to the Jurchens, the Koreans developed a powerful navy, constructed a thorough defense line of fortresses along the Tumen River, and took control of the island of Tsushima.⁵³ This defensive stance during within an environment of relative peace pushed the Koreans to depend on a heavy artillery of fortresses and warships. With the introduction of gunpowder during the Goryeo Dynasty, Korea developed advanced cannons, which were used with great effect at sea. Even though China was the main source of new military technologies in Asia, Korea excelled in both cannon manufacturing and shipbuilding in this age.⁵⁴
Japan, on the other hand, had been in a state of civil war for over a century, so the military had come to favor the muskets adopted from Portugal over such other weapons. This strategic difference in weapons development and implementation contributed to the in-war Japanese dominance on land, and the Korean dominance at sea⁵⁵.

As Japan had been at war since the mid-15th century, Hideyoshi had half a million battle-hardened soldiers at his disposal⁵⁶ to form the most professional army in Asia.⁵⁷ While Japan's chaotic state had left the Koreans with a very low estimate of Japan as a military threat,⁵⁸ a new sense of unity among the different political factions in Japan, and the "Sword Hunt" in 1588, (the confiscation of all weapons from the peasant) indicated otherwise.⁵⁹ Along with the hunt came “The Separation Edict” in 1591, which effectively put an end to all Japanese wakō piracy by prohibiting the daimyōs from supporting the pirates within their fiefs.⁵⁹ Ironically enough, the Koreans believed that Hideyoshi’s invasion would be just an extension of the previous pirate raids that had been repelled before.⁶⁰ As for the military situation in Joseon, the Korean scholar official Yu Seong-ryong observed, "not one in a hundred [Korean generals] knew the methods of drilling soldiers":⁶¹ rise in ranks depended far more on social connections than military knowledge.⁶² Korean soldiers were disorganized, ill-trained and ill-equipped,⁶³ and they were used mostly in construction projects such as building castle walls.⁶⁴

Problems with the Korean defense policies

Japanese arquebuses of the Edo era. These types of firearms were used by Japanese soldiers during Hideyoshi's invasions.

There were several defects with the organization of the Korean military.⁶⁵ An example was a defense policy that local officers could not individually respond to a foreign invasion outside of their jurisdiction until a higher ranking general, appointed by the king's court, arrived with a newly mobilized army.⁶⁵ This arrangement was highly inefficient in that the nearby forces would remain stationary until the mobile border commander arrived on the scene and took control.⁶⁵ Secondly, as the appointed general often came from an outside region, he was likely to be unfamiliar with the natural environment, the available technology and manpower of the invaded region.⁶⁵ Finally, as a main army was never maintained, new and ill-trained recruits conscripted during war constituted a significant part of the army.⁶⁵ The Yi Court managed to carry out some reforms, but even they were problematic. For example, the military training center established in 1589 in the Gyeongsang province recruited mostly only too young or too old soldiers (as able men targeted by the policy had higher priorities such as farming and other economic activities), augmented by some adventure-seeking aristocrats and slaves buying their freedom.⁶⁵

The dominant form of the Korean fortresses was the "Sanseong", or the mountain fortress,⁶⁶ which consisted of a stone wall that continued around a mountain in a serpentine fashion.⁵⁷ These walls were poorly designed with little use of towers and cross-fire positions (usually seen in European fortifications) and were mostly low in height.⁵⁷ It was a wartime policy for everyone to evacuate to one of these nearby fortresses and for those who failed to do so to be assumed as collaborators with the enemy; however, the policy never held any great effect because the fortresses were out of reach for most refugees.⁵⁷

Troop strength

Hideyoshi mobilized his army at the Nagoya Castle on Kyūshū (present-day Karatsu), newly built just for the purpose of housing the invasion forces and the reserves.⁶⁷ The first invasion consisted of nine divisions totaling 158,800 men, of which the last two of 21,500 were stationed as reserves in Tsushima and Iki respectively.⁶⁸

On the other hand, Joseon maintained only a few military units and no field army, and its defense depended heavily on the mobilization of the citizen soldiers in case of emergency.⁶⁴ During the first invasion, Joseon deployed a total of 84,500 regular troops throughout, assisted by 22,000 irregular volunteers.⁶⁹ The Chinese aid during the war could not have made up for the difference in numbers since they never maintained more than 60,000 troops in Korea at any point of the war,⁷⁰ while the Japanese used a total of 500,000 troops throughout the entire war.⁵⁶

As early as 1582, the renowned Korean scholar Lee Yul-gok recommended that the Yi Court implement a nationwide expansion of troops up to 100,000, including a conscription of slaves and sons of concubines, after the northern troops performed miserably against a Jurchen attack.⁶¹ However, as Lee was of the Western Faction, the dominant and competing Eastern Faction (led by Yu Seong-ryong) rejected the proposal.⁶¹ The same result applied to a 1588 proposal from a provincial governor to arm the twenty islands of the southern coast of the peninsula and a proposal in 1590 to fortify the islands around the port city of Busan.⁶¹ Even when the Japanese invasion seemed increasingly likely and even when Yu Seong-ryong switched sides on this issue, counter arguments brought purely out of political competition neutralized any gains for those advocating for the expansion of the military.⁶¹ By 1592, the Koreans were undermanned.

Weapons

Joseon cannons such as this one were extensively used in the Joseon navy.

紅夷大炮, bought from Portugess on Tianqi(1620-1627), an early type of cannon manufactured in England.

Since its introduction by the Portuguese traders on the island of Tanegashima in 1543,⁷¹ the arquebus became widely used in Japan.⁷² Both Korea and China had already been using firearms similar to the Portuguese arquebus, but were older models. These old firearms eventually fell into disuse in Korea and the focus for gunpowder weapons in Korea rested primarily in artillery and archery.⁷³ When the Japanese diplomats presented the Yi Court arquebuses as gifts, the Korean scholar official Yu Seong-ryong advocated for the use of the new weapon unsuccessfully and the Yi Court failed to realize the potency of the new weapon.⁴⁵

The Japanese relied mostly on the muskets (in combination with their bows) instead.⁷⁴

Large iron-tipped wooden arrow fired from Korean cannons.

The Korean infantry was equipped with one or more of the following personal weapons: swords, spears, tridents and bow-and-arrows.⁵⁴ The Koreans used one of the most advanced bows in Asia⁵⁵ - the composite reflex bow that had different materials laminated together (composite, the application of different characteristics of the materials for specific designs) with an inward curve (reflex) for maximum effectiveness.

The Korean bow's maximum range was 500 yards, compared to the 350 yards for the Japanese bows.⁷⁵ However, training a soldier to effectively use the bow was long and arduous, unlike the arquebus. The Chinese infantry used a variety of weapons, as they had to deal with many different environments throughout their empire, including bows (mainly crossbows),⁷⁵ swords (also for its cavalry),⁷⁶⁷⁷ muskets, smoke bombs and hand grenades.⁵⁵

An illustration of an ampulliform Chinese fire-lance with a gunpowder charge shooting a blast of flame with lead pellets as coviative projectiles. The weapon was called the 'phalanx-charging fire-gourd'

In the early part of the war, the Japanese gained a significant advantage with its large concentration of guns, which had a greater range of 600 yards⁷⁸ and penetrating power than the arrows,⁷⁹ and which could be fired in concentrated volleys to make up for its lack of accuracy (at both close and long ranges; the bow and arrow, at long range). However, later into the war, the Koreans and Chinese adopted and increased the use of the Japanese muskets.⁴⁵⁸⁰ It has also been claimed that the Chinese developed bullet-proof suits for use during the second invasion.⁸¹

Korea actively deployed their cavalry divisions in action, however the outcome was highly negative. The mountainous environment in Korea, which lacked both the flat plains suitable for cavalry charges and the grass essential in feeding the horses, and the Japanese use of muskets at long range put cavalry units at a disadvantage.⁷⁷

Korean cavalrymen were equipped with flails and spears (longer than the Japanese swords) for melee combat and bows and arrows for ranged engagement.⁸² Most of the cavalry action for the Koreans took place in the Battle of Chungju at the beginning of the war where they were outnumbered and wiped out by the Japanese infantry.⁸² The Japanese divisions included cavalry as well, sometimes equipped with guns designed smaller specifically for use on horseback (though most cavalry men would use the yari, the Japanese spear.).⁷⁸ The Japanese use of cavalry was reduced by their previous civil war experiences with the use of guns in concentrated volleys.⁸³

Naval power

An old painting of a panokseon.

Unlike other branches, the naval branch of the military in Korea excelled. Korea's lead in the artillery and shipbuilding technology gave their navies a tremendous advantage. With a history of dependence at sea and the need to fight Japanese pirates, the Korean navy was heavily developed throughout the Goryeo period and was highly advanced by the Joseon Dynasty. By the time of the Japanese invasion, Korea used the panokseon, which was the backbone of the Korean navy.

Especially with the complete lack of cannons on the Japanese ships in the first phase of the war,⁵⁴ the Korean fleets could bombard the Japanese ships while remaining outside of the retaliatory range of the Japanese muskets, arrows, and catapults.⁵⁴ Even when the Japanese attempted to add more cannons to their fleet,⁸⁴ their lightweight ship design prevented them from placing as many cannons or as heavy ones on board as the allies.⁸⁵

There were fundamental design flaws with the Japanese ships: first of all, most of the Japanese ships were merchant ships modified for the transportation of troops;⁵⁴ (it should be also noted that fishing vessels made up much of the Korean navy)⁸⁶ Second, the Japanese ships each contained a single square sail (effective only in favorable winds) while Korean ships could be powered by both sails and oars. Also, Japanese ships had V-shaped bottoms (also the Chinese ships as well) that were ideal for speed but were less maneuverable than the flat-bottomed panokseons; and fourth, the Japanese ships relied on nails to hold their planks together while the Korean panokseons used wooden pegs, and this difference added to the Korean advantage, because in water, nails corroded and loosened while wooden pegs expanded and strengthened the joints.

Also, the Korean dominance at sea is credited to the brilliance of Admiral Yi's leadership and strategic fighting helped him win all of his battles, negatively impacting the Japanese navies and their supply routes.

It should be noted that Hideyoshi tried but failed to hire two Portuguese galleons to join the invasion.⁸⁷

First invasion (1592–1593)

The initial attacks

Busan and Dadaejin

Main articles: Siege of Busan and Battle of Dadaejin

On May 23, 1592, the First Division of 7,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga⁹⁰ left Tsushima in the morning, and arrived at the port city of Busan in the evening.⁹¹ The Korean naval intelligence had already detected the Japanese fleet, but Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander of Gyeongsang, mistook the fleet as consisting of trading vessels on a mission.⁹² A later report of the arrival of an additional 100 Japanese vessels raised his suspicions, but the general did nothing about it.⁹² Sō Yoshitoshi landed alone on the Busan shore to ask the Koreans for a safe passage to China for the last time; the Koreans refused, and Sō Yoshitoshi besieged the city while Konishi Yukinaga attacked the nearby fort of Dadaejin the next morning.⁹¹ Japanese accounts claim that the battles dealt the Koreans complete annihilation (one claims 8,500 deaths, and another, 30,000 heads), while a Korean account claims that the Japanese themselves took significant losses before sacking the city.⁹³

Dongnae

"Dongnaebu Sunjeoldo", a Korean painting from 1760 depicting the Battle of Dongnae.

Main article: Siege of Dongnae

On the morning of May 25, 1592, the First Division arrived at Dongnae eupseong. ⁹³ The fight lasted twelve hours, killed 3,000, and resulted in a Japanese victory.⁹⁴ A popular legend describes the governor in charge of the fortress, Song Sang-hyeon. When Konishi Yukinaga again demanded, before the battle, that the Koreans allow the Japanese to travel through the peninsula, the governor replied, "It is easy for me to die, but difficult to let you pass."⁹⁴ Even when the Japanese troops during the battle neared his commanding post, Song remained seated with cool dignity.⁹⁴ And when a Japanese cut off Song's right arm holding his staff of command, Song picked up the staff with his left arm, which was then cut off; again Song picked it up, this time with his mouth, but was killed by a third blow.⁹⁴ The Japanese, impressed by Song's defiance, treated his body with proper burial ceremony.⁹⁴

The occupation of the Gyeongsang Province

Katō Kiyomasa's Second Division landed in Busan on May 27, and Kuroda Nagamasa's Third Division, west of Nakdong, on May 28.⁹⁵ The Second Division took the abandoned city of Tongdo on May 28, and captured Kyongju on May 30.⁹⁵ The Third Division, upon landing, captured the nearby Kimhae castle by keeping the defenders under pressure with gunfire while building ramps up to the walls with bundles of crops.⁹⁶ By June 3, the Third Division captured Unsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung, and Songju.⁹⁶ Meanwhile, Konishi Yukinaga's First Division passed the Yangsan mountain fortress (captured on the night of the Battle of Dongnae, when its defenders fled when the Japanese scouting party's fired their arquebuses), and captured the Miryang castle on the afternoon of May 26.⁹⁷ The First Division secured the Cheongdo fortress in the next few days, and destroyed the city of Daegu.⁹⁷ By June 3, the First Division crossed the Nakdong River, and stopped at the Sonsan mountain.⁹⁷

Joseon response

Upon receiving the news of the Japanese attacks, the Joseon government appointed General Yi Il as the mobile border commander, as was the established policy.⁹⁸ General Yi headed to Myongyong near the beginning of the strategically important Choryong pass to gather troops, but he had to travel further south to meet the troops assembled at the city of Daegu.⁹⁷ There, General Yi moved all troops back to Sangju, except for the survivors of the Battle of Dongnae who were to be stationed as a rearguard at the Choryong pass.⁹⁷

Battle of Sangju

Main article: Battle of Sangju

On April 25,⁹⁹ General Yi deployed a force of less than 1,000 men on two small hills to face the nearing First Division.¹⁰⁰ Assuming that rising smoke was from the burning of buildings by a nearby Japanese force, General Yi sent an officer to scout horseback; however, as he neared a bridge, the officer was ambushed by Japanese musket fire from below the bridge, and beheaded.¹⁰⁰ The Korean troops, watching him fall were greatly demoralized.¹⁰⁰ Soon the Japanese began the battle with their arquebuses; the Koreans replied with their arrows, which fell short of their targets.¹⁰⁰ The Japanese forces, having been divided into three, attacked the Korean lines from both the front and the two flanks; the battle ended with General Yi Il’s retreat and 700 Korean casualties.¹⁰⁰

Battle of Chungju

Main article: Battle of Chungju

General Yi Il then planned to use the Choryong pass, the only path through the western end of the Sobaek mountain range, to check the Japanese advance.¹⁰⁰ However, another commander, Sin Rip, appointed by the Joseon government had arrived in the area with a cavalry division, and moved 8,000 combined troops to the Chungju fortress, located above the Choryong pass.¹⁰¹ General Sin Rip then wanted to fight a battle on an open field, which he felt ideal for the deployment of his cavalry unit, and placed his units on the open fields of Tangeumdae.¹⁰¹ As the general feared that, since the cavalry consisted mostly of new recruits, his troops would flee in battle easily,¹⁰² he felt the need to trap his forces in the triangular area formed by the convergence of the Talcheon and Han rivers in the shape of a “Y”.¹⁰¹ However, the field was dotted with flooded rice paddies, and was not suitable for cavalry action.¹⁰¹

On June 5, 1592 the First Division of 18,000 men¹⁰² led by Konishi Yukinaga left Sangju, and reached an abandoned fortress at Mungyong by night.¹⁰³ The next day, the First Division arrived at Tangumdae in the early afternoon, where they faced the Korean cavalry unit at the Battle of Chungju. Konishi divided his forces into three, and attacked with arquebuses from both flanks and the front.¹⁰³ The Korean arrows fell short of the Japanese troops, which were outside their range, and General Sin led two charges that failed against the Japanese lines. General Sin then killed himself in the river, and the Koreans that tried to escape by the river either drowned, or were decapitated by the pursuing Japanese.¹⁰³

Capture of Seoul

The Second Division led by Katō Kiyomasa arrived at Chungju, with the Third Division not far behind.¹⁰⁴ There, Katō expressed his anger against Konishi for not waiting at Busan as planned, and attempting to take all of the glory for himself; then Nabeshima Naoshige proposed a compromise of dividing the Japanese troops into two separate groups to follow two different routes to Hanseong (the capital and the present-day Seoul), and allowing Katō Kiyomasa to choose the route that the Second Division would take to reach Seoul.¹⁰⁴ The two divisions began the race to capture Hanseong on June 8, and Katō took the shorter route across the Han River while Konishi went further upstream where smaller waters posed a lesser barrier.¹⁰⁴ Konishi arrived at Hanseong first on June 10 while the Second Division was halted at the river with no boats to with which to cross.¹⁰⁴ The First Division found the castle undefended with its gates tightly locked, as King Seonjo had fled the day before.¹⁰⁵ The Japanese broke into a small floodgate, located in the castle wall, and opened the capital city's gate from within.¹⁰⁵ Katō’s Second Division arrived at the capital the next day (having taking the same route as the First Division), and the Third and Fourth Divisions the day after.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions had landed on Busan, with the Ninth Division kept in reserve on the island of Iki.¹⁰⁵

Parts of Hanseong had already been looted, burnt (i.e. bureaus holding the slave records and the weapons), and abandoned by its inhabitants.¹⁰⁵ General Kim Myong-won, in charge of the defenses along the Han River, had retreated.¹⁰⁶ The King’s subjects stole the animals in the royal stables and fled before him, leaving the King to rely on farm animals.¹⁰⁶ In every village, the King’s party was met by inhabitants, lined up by the road, grieving that their King was abandoning them, and neglecting their duty of paying homage.¹⁰⁶ Parts of the southern shore of the Imjin River was burnt to deprive the Japanese troops of materials with which to make their crossing, and General Kim Myong-won deployed 12,000 troops at five points along the river.¹⁰⁶